Join us Monday, November 14th at 3:00 p.m. for a presentation by Eric M. Meslin, The Next Ethical Problem in Translational Science: Crossing the "Policy Valley of Death". Location: Indiana University Center for Bioethics, 410 West 10th Street, Suite 3100, Indianapolis, IN.
This presentation will make the case that there are two gaps to be bridged in successful translational science, one between "the bench and the bedside" and another between the "lab and legislature." Without a sturdy bridge from the lab to the legislature, advances in translational science could be lost to the "policy valley of death."
Friday, November 11, 2011
Thursday, December 16, 2010
Second Lawsuit Against Texas Department of State Health Services Over Alleged Misuse of Newborn Blood Spots
Last week parents in Texas filed a lawsuit against Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS) relating to the storage and distribution of their child’s newborn blood spots (NBS). Emerging approximately a year after a settlement over the NBS last December, this news headline looked like déjà vu. The new lawsuit focuses on the gaps of last December’s settlement agreement of the prior case against TDSHS and facts discovered after the settlement.
This separate class action lawsuit led by parent Jeffrey Higgins takes issue with how and for what purposes TDSHS shared the NBS. During the Beleno suit last year, the Beleno plaintiffs repeatedly asked TDSHS with whom they were sharing the NBS and for what purposes. During each of those discussions in the spring of 2009 and before a House Public Health Committee Hearing, TDSHS maintained it shared the NBS for the purpose of public health research but disclosed minimal additional information.
However, a large number of NBS were not used for public health research and this information did not become public until after the settlement. TDSHS numerous NBS to for-profit entities such as Perkin Elmer and bioMerieux in exchange for laboratory supplies. TDSHS only fully shared the extent of how many samples it shared, with what entities it shared the samples, and for what reasons on its website as part of the settlement agreement.
Perhaps most shocking, however, was that TDSHS sent 800 NBS to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) to build a mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) registry. AFIP designed this registry as a forensics tool to identify missing persons, solve old crimes, and eventually, share the samples internationally for law enforcement and anti-terrorism efforts. An investigative report that discovered this project surfaced in the media months after the settlement agreement in the Beleno case. [Read our commentary on the mtDNA registry here.]
- Second, he asserts that sharing his child’s NBS without consent constitutes a violation of privacy.
The Higgins complaint emphasizes TDSHS’s alleged failure to disclose significant facts and communicates the plaintiffs’ concerns about misuse of the hundreds of thousands of NBS that were sent to outside entities. Importantly, the settlement agreement last December 2009 only provided that TDSHS was required to destroy the NBS in its possession. This meant the settlement had no legal effect on what other entities did with the NBS they received from TDSHS.
Carrie Williams, spokesperson for TDSHS, maintains that these issues have already been resolved and stated that the Texas Civil Rights Project representing the plaintiffs merely wants “to double dip back into this issue with baseless assertions.”
Despite Williams’ response, mounting evidence does show a startling lack of transparency on the part of TDSHS. Furthermore, if the case goes before the same judge that heard the Beleno case, the result may have a substantial impact. As with other highly unexpected court rulings recently relating to gene patents and embryonic stem cell funding, this case could potentially constitute a monumental turn for whether it is acceptable to collect blood to use and share for research by the opt-out method. In the last Beleno case, Judge Biery in the Western District of Texas denied TDSHS’s motion to dismiss, meaning the court planned to hear the merits of the those Constitutional issues. However, before the parties argued the merits they arrived at a settlement agreement, taking the question out of the courtroom.
--Katherine Drabiak-Syed
Timeline of Events
- March 2001- December 2010: TDSHS sends NBS to outside entities for various other projects.
- May 2003: TDSHS sends 200 NBS to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to build their mtDNA registry.
- December 2006- December 2007: TDSHS sends a total of 3600 NBS to bioMerieux in exchange for laboratory supplies.
- May 2007: TDSHS sends 600 NBS to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to build their mtDNA registry.
- March 2009: Parents led by Andrea Beleno (Beleno plaintiffs) file a complaint against TDSHS.
- March 2009: Beleno plaintiffs question where TDSHS has sent the NBS and for what purposes. TDSHS maintains they use and share the NBS for public health research.
- December 2009: Beleno plaintiffs and TDSHS settle the lawsuit out of court.
- March 2010: An investigative report reveals TDSHS sent a total of 800 NBS to the AFIP’s mtDNA registry. TDSHS spokesperson, Carrie Williams, still asserts that this project falls within the category of “public health research.”
- December 2010: Parents led by Jeffrey Higgins file a complaint against TDSHS.
Read past PredictER News coverage relating to newborn blood spots here:
Oklahoma Legislature Requires Express Consent to Retain Newborn Blood Spots
Transparency of Texas' NBS Transfer and Reassessing Evasive Statutory Interpretation
Newborn Blood Spot Banking in Canada
Minnesota Judge's Dismissal of Newborn Blood Spot Case Misses the Mark
Newborn Blood Spot Litigation Continues in Minnesota and Texas
Critiquing HHS's Summary Recommendations on Newborn Blood Spots: Opt-Out is Not Optimal
Newborn Screening: an Update on Minnesota
Minnesota and Genetic Privacy: Why the Rule of Law is Good for Research
See also:
Jere Odell. Newborn Blood Spots, Biobanks, and the Law: Research Ethics in the News. Indiana Bioethics. February 2010.
Katherine Drabiak-Syed. Newborn blood spot banking: approaches to consent. PredictER Law and Policy Update.Indiana University Center for Bioethics. March 12, 2010.
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
Mercy Health Plan's Medical Data Security Breach Should Inform OCR's Harm Standard
A recent medical data security breach occurring in Keystone Mercy Health Plan and AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan in Philadelphia lends support to removing the harm threshold written into the Interim Final Rule of HIPAA and the HITECH Act before promulgating the Final Rule. In August of 2009, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) published the Interim Final Rule with request for comments on breach notification of protected health information (PHI), which set forth additional definitions and standards to relating to the Privacy Section. OCR is expected to issue the Final Rule by the end of this year or early next year.
When OCR published the Interim Final Rule last year, the media jumped on the inclusion of instructing the covered entity responsible for a breach of PHI to perform a risk assessment as a deciding factor of whether or not to disclose the breach to the individuals and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Eight members of Congress expressed their concern by writing a letter to Kathleen Sebelius, noting that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) that sets forth the statutory mandates relating to privacy of PHI does not include nor imply a harm standard and urged HHS to repeal or revise the harm threshold standard.
Section 13402 of the ARRA states that health care entities must notify the individual when there is an “unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information which compromises the security or privacy of that information.” In order to decide whether a breach compromises the individual’s security or privacy, the Interim Final Rule set forth a risk assessment criteria and translated a “compromise” of security or privacy to mean a “significant risk of financial, reputational, or other harm” to the individual. Problematically, the covered entity is tasked with assessing the risk of harm to determine whether it meets the threshold for disclosing the breach to the individual and HHS. The Interim Final Rule states that the covered entity should consider to whom the information was disclosed, the type and amount of information, and whether the information contained materials relating to potentially stigmatizing health conditions.
The letter written on behalf of eight Congressional representatives clarified that Congress specifically excluded a threshold for harm when promulgating Section 13402. Furthermore, requiring mandatory disclosure serves as a powerful incentive to health care entities to enact strict privacy and security protections to decrease the likelihood of a breach even occurring.
The Keystone Mercy Health Plan and AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan (MHP) incident is only the latest in a long line of PHI breaches. In late October, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that a computer flash drive belonging to Keystone Mercy Health Plan and AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan (MPH) was lost at a community health fair. The flash drive contained the medical record information of over 280,000 Pennsylvanian Medicaid recipients.
Donna Burtanger, Vice President of Communications at MHP, stated that company representatives were trying to use the health plan members’ PHI to personalize service at community health fairs. Burtanger offered the example of when a health plan member visits a church sponsored health fair, the insurance company representative can access the member’s medical record to schedule an appropriate screening test such as a mammogram.
As one article pointed out, MHP assumes that the patients under the plan would want company employees to have and access the patient’s full medical record or bring that sensitive health information into a less secure location such as a community health fair. This situation highlighted the vast discrepancy between how an insurance company and its members would view the risk-benefit calculation of permitting non-essential access of their sensitive medical information.
If a health insurance company such as MHP does not know when its members would not want their information shared, accessed, or transported, it likely would also face a disconnect when attempting to determine potential harm arising from a breach of its members’ PHI and whether that level of harm would require disclosure of the breach.
OCR should consider whether placing a level of discretion in the hands of health care entities given the knowledge of this difference will build the public’s trust of using electronic health information.
When OCR published the Interim Final Rule last year, the media jumped on the inclusion of instructing the covered entity responsible for a breach of PHI to perform a risk assessment as a deciding factor of whether or not to disclose the breach to the individuals and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Eight members of Congress expressed their concern by writing a letter to Kathleen Sebelius, noting that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) that sets forth the statutory mandates relating to privacy of PHI does not include nor imply a harm standard and urged HHS to repeal or revise the harm threshold standard.
Section 13402 of the ARRA states that health care entities must notify the individual when there is an “unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information which compromises the security or privacy of that information.” In order to decide whether a breach compromises the individual’s security or privacy, the Interim Final Rule set forth a risk assessment criteria and translated a “compromise” of security or privacy to mean a “significant risk of financial, reputational, or other harm” to the individual. Problematically, the covered entity is tasked with assessing the risk of harm to determine whether it meets the threshold for disclosing the breach to the individual and HHS. The Interim Final Rule states that the covered entity should consider to whom the information was disclosed, the type and amount of information, and whether the information contained materials relating to potentially stigmatizing health conditions.
The letter written on behalf of eight Congressional representatives clarified that Congress specifically excluded a threshold for harm when promulgating Section 13402. Furthermore, requiring mandatory disclosure serves as a powerful incentive to health care entities to enact strict privacy and security protections to decrease the likelihood of a breach even occurring.
The Keystone Mercy Health Plan and AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan (MHP) incident is only the latest in a long line of PHI breaches. In late October, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that a computer flash drive belonging to Keystone Mercy Health Plan and AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan (MPH) was lost at a community health fair. The flash drive contained the medical record information of over 280,000 Pennsylvanian Medicaid recipients.
Donna Burtanger, Vice President of Communications at MHP, stated that company representatives were trying to use the health plan members’ PHI to personalize service at community health fairs. Burtanger offered the example of when a health plan member visits a church sponsored health fair, the insurance company representative can access the member’s medical record to schedule an appropriate screening test such as a mammogram.
As one article pointed out, MHP assumes that the patients under the plan would want company employees to have and access the patient’s full medical record or bring that sensitive health information into a less secure location such as a community health fair. This situation highlighted the vast discrepancy between how an insurance company and its members would view the risk-benefit calculation of permitting non-essential access of their sensitive medical information.
If a health insurance company such as MHP does not know when its members would not want their information shared, accessed, or transported, it likely would also face a disconnect when attempting to determine potential harm arising from a breach of its members’ PHI and whether that level of harm would require disclosure of the breach.
OCR should consider whether placing a level of discretion in the hands of health care entities given the knowledge of this difference will build the public’s trust of using electronic health information.
--Katherine Drabiak-Syed
Friday, October 29, 2010
Nuffield Council Reviews DTC Genetic Testing
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics recently released the results of a two year study: Medical profiling and online medicine: the ethics of 'personalised healthcare' in a consumer age (2010). The report devotes chapters to six "case studies" (these are not formal case studies, but rather topics for investigation), all are relevant to the ethical development and delivery of predictive medicine. The six case studies address: online health information, online personal health records, online purchasing of pharmaceuticals, telemedicine, personal genetic profiling for disease susceptibility, and direct-to-consumer body imaging.
However, the chapter on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing, 9. Personal genetic profiling for disease susceptibility, will be of particular interest to readers in the States. Three of the big names in DTC genomics are U.S. companies (Navigenics, 23andMe, and Pathway Genomics) and, given the price tag for services, much of the consumers are in the States as well. In general, the Council cautions that DTC genetic testing lacks a sufficient evidence base for reliable clinical use and that consumers should think carefully about the risks. Nevertheless, the workgroup does not oppose the market for DTC genetic testing, but rather advices companies to provide greater transparency regarding the evidence and the potential harms. On the regulatory front, the report proposes prohibiting the market for tests with no proven clinical utility. See 9.45:
We recommend that responsible authorities pay more attention to whether genetic test providers are making clinical claims for their products, even if implied rather than explicit (such as in their ‘customers’ testimonials’). If so, they should ask for evidence to be supplied. We direct this recommendation to authorities responsible for pre-market review and advertising standards, including the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and the Advertising Standards Authority in the UK.
The council also calls for government (UK) websites to publish the risks and limitations of DTC genetics, for restricting pediatric DTC genetic services, and for programs to educate healthcare providers who may need to discuss DTC genetic test results with patients.
In addition to the six "case studies" the report also provides a chapter devoted to ethical values the workgroup identified as well as the process of ethical reasoning it employed. The workgroup the following ethical values to consider:
1. The value of safeguarding private information;
2. The value of individuals being able to pursue their own interests in their own way;
3. The value of efforts by the state to reduce harm;
4. The value of using public resources efficiently and fairly;
5. Sharing risks, protecting the vulnerable: the value of social solidarity.
These values, of course, are often in conflict with each other. Thus, the workgroup employed a practical approach (not to resolve) but to "soften" conflicts, see 3.18:
[T]he approach we follow in this report is not so much to attempt to solve the dilemmas but to propose forms of oversight and voluntary conduct so that society can manage its way around them and reduce the conflict while gaining general assent. This approach means trying to accommodate as many as possible of the different values we have identified without giving one absolute priority over another.
I think this is a pragmatic approach, but (perhaps) too obvious to bear replicating. It might have been more interesting to learn how the workgroup identified the five ethical values it employed.
In addition to its well-considered case studies, and explained ethics practice, the report serves as a valuable review (with an emphasis on the issues in the UK) of the literature on the ethics of personalized and genomic medicine. It can be downloaded at no cost from the Council's website: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/
Other Predictive Health Ethics News
Tara Parker-Pope. Taking genetic history to the grave. Well (NYT Blog). October 28, 2010.
Rita Rubin. Most doctors are behind the learning curve on genetic tests. USA Today. October 25, 2010.
Laurie Udesky. The ethics of direct-to-consumer genetic testing. The Lancet. October 23, 2010.
Jessica Reaves. Stem Cell Research Skirts Hurdles, but Raises Ethics Issues, Too. The New York Times. October 22, 2010.
Philippa Brice. Loss of UK genetics public bodies confirmed. PHG Foundation News. October 15, 2010.
Experts warn about genetic tests. Reuters. October 12, 2010.
Matt Ridley. The Failed Promise of Genomics. The Wall Street Journal. October 9, 2010.
Amy Harmon. Stem Cells in Court, Scientists Fear for Careers. The New York Times. October 6, 2010.
Josephine Johnston. America’s Stem Cell Mess. The Scientist. October 1, 2010.
Dan Vorhaus. HHS Pulls the Plug on Genetics Advisory Committee. Genomics Law Report. September 23, 2010.
-- J.O.
Friday, September 17, 2010
Oklahoma Legislature Requires Express Consent to Retain Newborn Blood Spots
During the past several months, states continue splitting on the issue of how to approach their state health department’s retention and research use of newborn blood spots (NBS).
On September 13, The Edmond Sun ran an article on Oklahoma’s enrolled Senate Bill 1250, a new law that prevents the state health department from storing and using NBS. The text of the law reads:
Oklahoma’s law demonstrates that different jurisdictions are arriving at starkly divergent interpretations of seemingly simple definitions such as what is or is not encompassed in the meaning of DNA. SB 1250 refers to storing or using DNA, and Sen. Nichols unequivocally explains that he intends this to encompass the retention of NBS- a blood sample. This interpretation is significant because it means the law will use the term DNA to include biological materials from which DNA can be derived.
Unlike Sen. Nichols’ inclusive approach, in late August the Court of Appeals in Minnesota affirmed that NBS do not fall within the definition of “genetic information.” We previously wrote on the Bearder case here. Minnesota has determined that biological samples (such as NBS) that contain DNA and genetic information are not genetic information.
This distinction of separating the source of raw materials (the blood) used for research from the substance of the raw materials (the DNA) is also playing out in the stem cell legal battles- although here, the debate centers around using embryos to create embryonic stem cells v. research using embryonic stem cells. In both arenas, interpreting uncertainty or disagreement of how to apply a law to favor rsearch connects to the decision to splice parts of the process to circumvent barriers to using raw materials.
SB 1250 attempts to rectify several terms that have been disputed when determining the rules for retaining and using biological materials from newborns. Although Sen. Nichols references the law with regard to NBS, the language broadly refers to “DNA from any newborn child,” which would include NBS as well as other biological samples such as umbilical cord blood that contains DNA. This would mean that if an Oklahoma hospital or a partnering research entity wanted to retain and use other biological samples containing DNA from the newborn, the hospital would need to seek parental consent. Furthermore, this law clarifies that the hospital and state health department are not exempt from compliance with the law under a research exception.
Interestingly, the text refers to the law as necessary to preserve the “public peace, health and safety” in Oklahoma. The law is set to be codified in the Oklahoma statute in the same location as crimes consisting of public disturbances, safety hazards, and physical violations against one’s person- examples of tangible harm to indivduals and society at large. This classification itself nods a recognition to the Beleno case in Texas, where plaintiffs’ emphatically argued unauthorized retention of NBS constituted a serious privacy violation and an unlawful seizure of one’s deeply private medical and genetic information.
Whether other state legislatures and health departments agree with Oklahoma’s requirement for express parental consent or the current state of “emergency,” this law reminds us that each jurisdiction should adopt a prospective law or departmental policy to address these questions in a deliberate manner.
--Katherine Drabiak-Syed
On September 13, The Edmond Sun ran an article on Oklahoma’s enrolled Senate Bill 1250, a new law that prevents the state health department from storing and using NBS. The text of the law reads:
“A laboratory, medical facility, hospital, or birthing place is prohibited from the unathorized storage, transferring, use, or databasing of DNA from any newborn child without express parental consent.Sen. Nichols explained he sponsored the bill as a deliberate pre-emptive measure in response to ethical and privacy concerns related to unauthorized “databasing” and use of NBS in other states. According to Sharon Vaz, the Oklahoma State Department of Health genetics coordinator, Oklahoma only retains the samples for 42 days and does not have plans for long term NBS retention or to use the NBS for research purposes.
It being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist…”
Oklahoma’s law demonstrates that different jurisdictions are arriving at starkly divergent interpretations of seemingly simple definitions such as what is or is not encompassed in the meaning of DNA. SB 1250 refers to storing or using DNA, and Sen. Nichols unequivocally explains that he intends this to encompass the retention of NBS- a blood sample. This interpretation is significant because it means the law will use the term DNA to include biological materials from which DNA can be derived.
Unlike Sen. Nichols’ inclusive approach, in late August the Court of Appeals in Minnesota affirmed that NBS do not fall within the definition of “genetic information.” We previously wrote on the Bearder case here. Minnesota has determined that biological samples (such as NBS) that contain DNA and genetic information are not genetic information.
This distinction of separating the source of raw materials (the blood) used for research from the substance of the raw materials (the DNA) is also playing out in the stem cell legal battles- although here, the debate centers around using embryos to create embryonic stem cells v. research using embryonic stem cells. In both arenas, interpreting uncertainty or disagreement of how to apply a law to favor rsearch connects to the decision to splice parts of the process to circumvent barriers to using raw materials.
SB 1250 attempts to rectify several terms that have been disputed when determining the rules for retaining and using biological materials from newborns. Although Sen. Nichols references the law with regard to NBS, the language broadly refers to “DNA from any newborn child,” which would include NBS as well as other biological samples such as umbilical cord blood that contains DNA. This would mean that if an Oklahoma hospital or a partnering research entity wanted to retain and use other biological samples containing DNA from the newborn, the hospital would need to seek parental consent. Furthermore, this law clarifies that the hospital and state health department are not exempt from compliance with the law under a research exception.
Interestingly, the text refers to the law as necessary to preserve the “public peace, health and safety” in Oklahoma. The law is set to be codified in the Oklahoma statute in the same location as crimes consisting of public disturbances, safety hazards, and physical violations against one’s person- examples of tangible harm to indivduals and society at large. This classification itself nods a recognition to the Beleno case in Texas, where plaintiffs’ emphatically argued unauthorized retention of NBS constituted a serious privacy violation and an unlawful seizure of one’s deeply private medical and genetic information.
Whether other state legislatures and health departments agree with Oklahoma’s requirement for express parental consent or the current state of “emergency,” this law reminds us that each jurisdiction should adopt a prospective law or departmental policy to address these questions in a deliberate manner.
--Katherine Drabiak-Syed
Thursday, August 19, 2010
California Department of Public Health Orders Changes to Berkeley's Genetic Test Program
Last week Berkeley altered its Bring Your Genes to Cal Program to stop the genetic test results from being disseminated back to participating students in response to an order from the California Department of Public Health (CDPH). Berkeley will still hold discussions and lectures based on the aggregate information as previously planned. [See our posting on the Bring Your Genes to Cal Program here.]
On August 11, Berkeley and CDPH met to discuss the program’s compliance with the California Business and Professions Code which requires that a physician order clinical laboratory tests. In a statement to CDPH, Berkeley asserted its program should fall under an exemption for labs performing tests as research where the results are not reported to patients as part of a medical or health assessment. Berkeley maintained that these statutory requirements were not applicable to its program because Bring Your Genes to Cal constituted an “educational experiment,” students are not “patients,” and the three specific gene variants tested are not disease related.
Despite these claims, the program would have returned genetic test results back to each student, which should be defined as part of a health assessment because the program directed students to use these results to inform their dietary and nutritional choices as well as make personal health decisions. According to Dean Schissel’s message to students in the informed consent video, these genetic test results would then allow them to take measures to improve their health such as eating more or less of a particular food, or avoiding alcohol if their test results showed an ethanol “allergy.” Schlissel’s assertion stretched the meaning of California’s exemption in denying that this “experiment” constitutes clinical laboratory tests or that this information is medically significant. Arguments over statuory construction closely parallel the current federal regulatory loopholes relating to DTC genetic tests.
As genomeweb observed, the semantic debate between Berkeley and CDPH is strikingly similar to the volleys between CDPH and DTC genetic test companies that occurred back in 2008. In June of 2008, CDPH had responded to consumer complaints and sent out thirteen cease and desist letters to DTC genetic testing companies, asserting that their policies did not comply with licensure requirements set forth in California law. Two of the targeted companies, 23andMe and Navigenics, asserted they offer an “informational service” providing personal genetic information and not “medical testing services,” so they did not need to obtain a license. CDPH agreed and granted licenses to Navigenics and 23andMe in August 2008.
Now, with Congress and the FDA scrutinizing the federal regulatory requirements, CDPH seems to be responding to the current political shift of opinion and the uncertainties related to providing genetic test results without a physician intermediary and oversight of the test's accuracy and validity. Or perhaps CDPH agreed with concerns in the defeated California Assembly Bill 70. This bill would have urged state schools within the California State University and University of California system from requesting students’ DNA for the purpose of genetic testing.
Defeated AB 70 also raised specific privacy concerns stemming from a university collecting students’ DNA samples for genetic testing and retaining students’ coded genetic information. Although Berkeley's program will incinerate students’ DNA samples following testing, it plans to keep students’ genetic information for further study. Data attack in GWAS studies exemplifies the principle that our understanding of data security relating to genetic information is uncertain, and we have continually underestimated the potential for security breaches. Dean Schlissel’s unwavering promises of absolute privacy seems naively optimistic given what we know in this area.
It seems this “teaching study” has given Berkeley and its freshmen more than they could have anticipated. In addition to the campus lectures about genetics and personalized medicine, students have already learned the ethical and legal complexities associated with emerging technology- the varied parties who have a say, the definition debates, and the unpredictability of the resolution.
On August 11, Berkeley and CDPH met to discuss the program’s compliance with the California Business and Professions Code which requires that a physician order clinical laboratory tests. In a statement to CDPH, Berkeley asserted its program should fall under an exemption for labs performing tests as research where the results are not reported to patients as part of a medical or health assessment. Berkeley maintained that these statutory requirements were not applicable to its program because Bring Your Genes to Cal constituted an “educational experiment,” students are not “patients,” and the three specific gene variants tested are not disease related.
Despite these claims, the program would have returned genetic test results back to each student, which should be defined as part of a health assessment because the program directed students to use these results to inform their dietary and nutritional choices as well as make personal health decisions. According to Dean Schissel’s message to students in the informed consent video, these genetic test results would then allow them to take measures to improve their health such as eating more or less of a particular food, or avoiding alcohol if their test results showed an ethanol “allergy.” Schlissel’s assertion stretched the meaning of California’s exemption in denying that this “experiment” constitutes clinical laboratory tests or that this information is medically significant. Arguments over statuory construction closely parallel the current federal regulatory loopholes relating to DTC genetic tests.
As genomeweb observed, the semantic debate between Berkeley and CDPH is strikingly similar to the volleys between CDPH and DTC genetic test companies that occurred back in 2008. In June of 2008, CDPH had responded to consumer complaints and sent out thirteen cease and desist letters to DTC genetic testing companies, asserting that their policies did not comply with licensure requirements set forth in California law. Two of the targeted companies, 23andMe and Navigenics, asserted they offer an “informational service” providing personal genetic information and not “medical testing services,” so they did not need to obtain a license. CDPH agreed and granted licenses to Navigenics and 23andMe in August 2008.
Now, with Congress and the FDA scrutinizing the federal regulatory requirements, CDPH seems to be responding to the current political shift of opinion and the uncertainties related to providing genetic test results without a physician intermediary and oversight of the test's accuracy and validity. Or perhaps CDPH agreed with concerns in the defeated California Assembly Bill 70. This bill would have urged state schools within the California State University and University of California system from requesting students’ DNA for the purpose of genetic testing.
Defeated AB 70 also raised specific privacy concerns stemming from a university collecting students’ DNA samples for genetic testing and retaining students’ coded genetic information. Although Berkeley's program will incinerate students’ DNA samples following testing, it plans to keep students’ genetic information for further study. Data attack in GWAS studies exemplifies the principle that our understanding of data security relating to genetic information is uncertain, and we have continually underestimated the potential for security breaches. Dean Schlissel’s unwavering promises of absolute privacy seems naively optimistic given what we know in this area.
It seems this “teaching study” has given Berkeley and its freshmen more than they could have anticipated. In addition to the campus lectures about genetics and personalized medicine, students have already learned the ethical and legal complexities associated with emerging technology- the varied parties who have a say, the definition debates, and the unpredictability of the resolution.
--Katherine Drabiak-Syed
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
DTC Tests Face Scrutiny at FDA, by GAO, and Congress
Last week produced a flurry of activity at the FDA and before Congress relating to regulation of field of DTC genetic tests. Here is a summary:
At the FDA:
The FDA sent out additional letters to fourteen more DTC companies, stating that the companies’ respective tests constitute in vitro diagnostic devices subject to FDA regulation. These letters mirror the original letters sent out in June to 23andMe, Navigenics, deCODE Genetics, Knome and Illumina, which we discussed here and here.
On July 19-20, the FDA convened its Public Meeting on the Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests to discuss the history and current regulatory status of LDTs and status of DTC genetic tests. The meeting was divided into four sessions to address:
- patient and clinical considerations;
- clinical laboratory challenges;
- concerns, benefits, and risks of DTC testing; and
- education and outreach so laboratories can comply with regulations and physicians are enabled use the genetic information provided in these tests
GAO Report:
On July 22, the Government Accountability Office released its report Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Tests: Misleading Test Results Are Further Complicated by Deceptive Marketing and Other Questionable Practices and offered it as testimony during the hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce in the House of Representatives.
The GAO posed as consumers and sent DNA samples from five people to four selected companies. It also examined a sample if fifteen companies’ advertising and marketing practices.
This report revealed numerous appalling flaws related to selected DTC test’s accuracy, company follow up with consumers, and consumer privacy protections. The report found the following five problems:
(1) each donor’s factual profile received disease risk predictions that varied across all four companies, indicating that identical DNA can yield contradictory results depending solely on the company it was sent to for analysis;
(2) these risk predictions often conflicted with the donors’ factual illnesses and family medical histories;
(3) none of the companies could provide the donors who submitted fictitious African American and Asian profiles with complete test results for their ethnicity but did not explicitly disclose this limitation prior to purchase;
(4) one company provided donors with reports that showed conflicting predictions for the same DNA and profile, but did not explain how to interpret these different results; and
(5) follow-up consultations offered by three of the companies provided only general information and not the expert advice the companies promised to provide.
Varied risk prediction from each company grossly undermines each company’s claim of superiority and accuracy, weakening the reliability of the test results. For example, a male “consumer,” age 48, received three different results about his risk for hypertension. One company claimed he had a below average risk of developing hypertension, a second company stated his risk was average, and a third company noted his risk was above average. Accordingly, if a real consumer would integrate this information to make lifestyles changes as advocate by one of the companies, he may be incentivized toward undesirable health behaviors based on a mistaken belief of lower risk.
A widely circulated YouTube video documented some companies’ dangerous blurring of risk and diagnosis during follow up with company representatives. Here is one example:
Fictitious consumer: “So if I’m high risk, does that mean I’ll definitely get breast cancer?”
Company representative: “You…you’d be in the high risk of, you know, pretty much getting it.”
The GAO classified this exchange as “horrifying” and “disconcerting.” It leads me to wonder how many real consumers received similar devastating and incorrect information when they attempted to follow up their own test results? How many went to their physicians with these results and remained unconvinced when the physicians attempted to reassure them? In the near future, these companies should brace themselves for the legal backlash that is sure to follow from consumers who experienced such troubling exchanges and may vent their anxiety and frustration in the form of legal complaints alleging negligence and emotional damages.
Before Congress
During the hearing on the Hill, Rep. Griffith echoed this cautious sentiment, suggesting when confronted with alarming genetic risk information, consumers are likely to panic first and ask questions later. The Genomics Law Report provides a summary of the hearing here.
Despite GAO’s conclusion that DTC companies provide results that are “ambiguous and misleading,” Rep. Burgess and Rep. Waxman voiced their disfavor of overly intrusive regulation and advocated for a system that would still allow consumers to access their personal genetic information.
However, the GAO report illustrates precisely why the model for these tests will continue to encounter problems without the guidance of a physician as gatekeeper and interpreter. In another exchange recorded on the YouTube video, a company representative tells one “consumer” he can eventually stop taking his prescription medicine for high cholesterol if he purchases and uses the company’s pricey vitamin supplements. Advice connecting risk to behavior and medication changes should require a visit to a healthcare provider, not a phone call to a faceless company representative with uncertain credentials.
Even if a company’s test is accurate and it ceases to disseminate misleading advice about the power of its supplements, consumers still want (and need) additional information and advice from healthcare professionals to interpret and act on the test results they receive.
-Katherine Drabiak-Syed
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