The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) ruled in the case
Brüstle v. Greenpeace (
Case C-34/10) brought up by Greenpeace seeking annulment of the German patent –
Patent No. DE19756864C1 – held by Mr. Brüstle concerning isolated and purified neural precursor cells, processes for their production from embryonic stem cells and the use of neural precursor cells for the treatment of neural defects. The main focus of the decision is the interpretation of Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC (
1998 OJL (L213) 13-18) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions.
The German Federal Patent Court (
Bundespatentgericht, “BPatG”) ruled on December 5, 2006,
Case 3 Ni 42/04, on the basis of Paragraph 22(1)
German Patent Protection Act (“PatG”) in conjunction with Paragraph 21 Subsection 1 Point 1 PatG in conjunction with Paragraph 2 Subsection 2 Point 3 PatG, that the patent at issue is invalid in so far as it covers precursor cells obtained from human embryonic stem cells and processes for the production of those precursor cells. The court held that the patent also violates the
German Embryonic Protection Act (“ESchG”), which prohibits research with human embryos. Mr. Brüstle appealed against the judgment to the
German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, “BGH”), December 17, 2009,
Case Xa ZR 58/07.
In accordance with the guiding principles of European Union Law, the national law of the Member States must be interpreted in terms of the rules and regulations set by the European Union; the court held that the outcome of the application for the annulment of the patent de-pends on the interpretation of Article 6 of the Directive, which is implemented in the PatG as well as the ESchG. Thus, the BGH referred specific questions to the ECJ and requested a preliminary ruling regarding:
1. the interpretation of the term “human embryos” in Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive;
2. the interpretation of the expression “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes” and the question if this especially includes the use for the purposes of scientific research;
3. and if an invention is unpatentable even if the use of human embryos does not form part of the technical teaching claimed with the patent, but whose production necessi-tates the prior destruction of human embryos. See, in detail: Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [German Federal Court of Justice], December 17, 2009,
Case Xa ZR 58/07; ECJ, October 18, 2011,
Case C-34/10, para. 23.
The Concept of Human Embryo
Because the Directive lacks a definition of the term “embryo” and after considering the preamble and the scope of the directive, the court ruled:
"any human ovum after fertilisation, any nonfertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted, and any nonfertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis constitute[s] a human embryo" (Case C-34/10, para. 53);
"stem cells obtained from a human embryo at the blastocyst stage, […] whether they are capable of commencing the process of development of a human being, […] are included within the concept of human embryo” (Case C-34/10, para. 37).
Human Embryos for Scientific Research
The Directive is limited to the patentability of biotechnological inventions; it does not regulate the use of human embryos in the context of scientific research directly. Considering Recital 14 of the
Directive, the court ruled:
"[the] use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes' within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive also covers use for purposes of scientific research" and are not patentable;
"only use[s] for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which [are] applied to the human embryo and are useful to it [are] patentable". (Case C-34/10, para. 46)
Inventions Based on the Destruction of Human Embryos
Taking into account that a human embryo is destroyed when a stem cell is removed during the blastocyst stage, for example, in the production of neural precursor cells (
Case C-34/10, para. 48), the court held that when the destruction occurs at a stage long before the implementation of the invention it is irrelevant (
Case C-34/10, para. 49). Therefore, the court ruled:
"an invention must be regarded as unpatentable, even if the claims of the patent do not concern the use of human embryos, where the implementation of the invention requires the destruction of human embryos" (Case C-34/10, para. 49);
"the fact that destruction may occur at a stage long before the implementation of the invention, as in the case of the production of embryonic stem cells from a lineage of stem cells the mere production of which implied the destruction of human embryos is, in that regard, irrelevant" (Case C-34/10, para. 49).
This recent decision may do more to impede the progress of embryonic stem cell research in Europe than any inherent limits in the state of science itself. The court used a very broad definition of the term “embryo” without using any scientific reference points. With its definition of “embryo” the court included nearly all possible stages in the development. Although, the court recognized that non-fertilized ova are incapable of developing into a human being, it nonetheless placed them on the same level as an embryo. The implications of this decision are widespread in Europe; the decision is binding and cannot be appealed. It remains to be seen how the German courts and legislature, as well as those of the other Member States will react and comply.
-- Bianca Buechner, Ph.D., LL.M. Candidate
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law
