Legislatures Race to Define Rights and Obligations Relating to Genetic Information: Avoiding Another Bearder

California is the latest state to take steps toward defining permissible uses and restrictions relating to obtaining, retaining, and sharing individuals’ genetic information.  Senator Alex Padilla recently introduced Senate Bill 1267, the Genetic Information Privacy Act, designed to protect individuals against surreptitious testing of their genetic material without consent.  SB 1267 is a comprehensive piece of legislation which would require a specific authorization to obtain, analyze, or disclose genetic information unless otherwise exempted or allowed by law (exemptions include activities such as newborn screening, duties of the medical examiner, using some types of data for research, and law enforcement uses).  The legislation also contains a civil penalty structure for violations and provides a private right of action for aggrieved individuals who suffer economic, bodily, or emotional harm proximately caused by such violations. 

California’s legislation classifies genetic information within a privacy framework and seeks to increase individual control by requiring the individual to understand the purposes of how the information will be used and stored, as well as which entities have access to the information.  Other states such as Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Vermont have introduced similar legislation that govern the collection, retention, and sharing of DNA, genetic information, and or genetic test results.  These states differ in their comprehensiveness and scope- from South Dakota’s paragraph long House Bill 1260 to Alabama’s extensive eleven page House 78.

Unlike California, these states seek to classify DNA, genetic information, and or genetic test results within a property law framework rather than under the umbrella of privacy, which carries distinct legal requirements for transfer, use, and retention.   As legislatures race to define individual rights within existing  legal concepts, they should be well aware of property law’s limitations at upholding individual autonomy while appropriately and efficiently defining permissible research uses depending on how the legislature crafts the language of the statute. 

As we witnessed in the progression of the Bearder v. Minnesota litigation (related to collecting, retaining, and disseminating newborn blood spots) even if a law is seemingly clear, individuals, clinicians, and investigators still may face confusion over relevant terminology and obligations relating to the meaning of key terms and the scope of consent exemptions.  (Blogs and article on that topic here.) Specifically, will these statutes govern the collection, use, and dissemination of genetic information after the analysis of a genetic test using a blood sample or will the language broadly address collecting blood samples, DNA, and genetic test information?  Public health officials, investigators, and individuals have vehemently disagreed over the meaning and scope of these terms and when consent is required.  Individuals have claimed immense injury to privacy and dignity when public health officials and investigators collect, retain, and disseminate their blood samples without consent, while public health officials and investigators decried setbacks to research efforts after they were legally ordered to destroy their improperly obtained blood samples. 

Last November, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified its state Genetic Privacy Act, holding that an individual’s blood sample contains biological information and biological information falls within the definition of genetic information.   That is, any statutory references to genetic information also applies to blood samples.  It appears that the majority adopted the Plaintiffs' argument  that a blood sample contains DNA and the structure of DNA is genetic information, which means statutory requirements governing the collection, use, storage, and dissemination of genetic information necessarily include blood samples.   

Although this seminal holding is jurisdictionally limited, defining the meaning and scope of biological specimen, blood sample, DNA, and genetic information requires painstaking semantic precision.  Furthermore, the concurrence/dissent in Bearder demonstrates even keen legal minds apply varying logic to interpret terminology and arrive at starkly divergent conclusions.  Defining these terms becomes even more pressing should this or similar state legislation pass because it carries the compliance incentive of a penalty structure for violation.  Legislators should take note of litigation in this area and aim to meticulously and unambiguously define relevant terminology so individuals, public health officials, and investigators can understand their interrelated rights, obligations, and statutory exemptions.  

--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Second Lawsuit Against Texas Department of State Health Services Over Alleged Misuse of Newborn Blood Spots

Last week parents in Texas filed a lawsuit against Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS) relating to the storage and distribution of their child’s newborn blood spots (NBS). Emerging approximately a year after a settlement over the NBS last December, this news headline looked like déjà vu. The new lawsuit focuses on the gaps of last December’s settlement agreement of the prior case against TDSHS and facts discovered after the settlement.

This separate class action lawsuit led by parent Jeffrey Higgins takes issue with how and for what purposes TDSHS shared the NBS. During the Beleno suit last year, the Beleno plaintiffs repeatedly asked TDSHS with whom they were sharing the NBS and for what purposes. During each of those discussions in the spring of 2009 and before a House Public Health Committee Hearing, TDSHS maintained it shared the NBS for the purpose of public health research but disclosed minimal additional information.

However, a large number of NBS were not used for public health research and this information did not become public until after the settlement. TDSHS numerous NBS to for-profit entities such as Perkin Elmer and bioMerieux in exchange for laboratory supplies. TDSHS only fully shared the extent of how many samples it shared, with what entities it shared the samples, and for what reasons on its website as part of the settlement agreement.

Perhaps most shocking, however, was that TDSHS sent 800 NBS to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) to build a mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) registry. AFIP designed this registry as a forensics tool to identify missing persons, solve old crimes, and eventually, share the samples internationally for law enforcement and anti-terrorism efforts. An investigative report that discovered this project surfaced in the media months after the settlement agreement in the Beleno case. [Read our commentary on the mtDNA registry here.]

The Higgins lawsuit focuses on TDSHS’s lack of transparency during the Beleno settlement discussions and alleges that TDSHS intentionally withheld pertinent information that would have substantially altered that case’s discussions and outcome. Similar to the Beleno complaint, Higgins argues that selling or trading the NBS to outside corporations and giving the NBS to the AFIP to build the mtDNA registry rises to Constitutional violations.

1. First, he maintains that taking his child’s NBS and sharing it with outside entities without consent constitutes a violation of his child’s right against seizure of deeply private genetic information.
2. Second, he asserts that sharing his child’s NBS without consent constitutes a violation of privacy.

The Higgins complaint emphasizes TDSHS’s alleged failure to disclose significant facts and communicates the plaintiffs’ concerns about misuse of the hundreds of thousands of NBS that were sent to outside entities. Importantly, the settlement agreement last December 2009 only provided that TDSHS was required to destroy the NBS in its possession. This meant the settlement had no legal effect on what other entities did with the NBS they received from TDSHS.

Accordingly, the complaint asks the court for injunctive relief to stop TDSHS from sharing the NBS with outside entities without consent in the future and for the court to order outside entities that previously received the NBS to destroy the blood samples and any associated data they may have. The first request is significant because it directly challenges the current law in Texas that requires parents to opt-out if they do not want TDSHS to use and share their child’s NBS for research and instead argues that TDSHS must actually obtain consent.

Carrie Williams, spokesperson for TDSHS, maintains that these issues have already been resolved and stated that the Texas Civil Rights Project representing the plaintiffs merely wants “to double dip back into this issue with baseless assertions.”

Despite Williams’ response, mounting evidence does show a startling lack of transparency on the part of TDSHS. Furthermore, if the case goes before the same judge that heard the Beleno case, the result may have a substantial impact. As with other highly unexpected court rulings recently relating to gene patents and embryonic stem cell funding, this case could potentially constitute a monumental turn for whether it is acceptable to collect blood to use and share for research by the opt-out method. In the last Beleno case, Judge Biery in the Western District of Texas denied TDSHS’s motion to dismiss, meaning the court planned to hear the merits of the those Constitutional issues. However, before the parties argued the merits they arrived at a settlement agreement, taking the question out of the courtroom.

The case is still in its infancy, and TDSHS has yet to file a response to Higgins’ complaint. As the case progresses and if Judge Biery eventually hears the merits, we may see another highly surprising court ruling impacting future collection of blood for research purposes.

--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Timeline of Events

• March 2001- December 2010: TDSHS sends NBS to outside entities for various other projects.

• May 2003: TDSHS sends 200 NBS to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to build their mtDNA registry.

• December 2006- December 2007: TDSHS sends a total of 3600 NBS to bioMerieux in exchange for laboratory supplies.

• May 2007: TDSHS sends 600 NBS to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to build their mtDNA registry.

• March 2009: Parents led by Andrea Beleno (Beleno plaintiffs) file a complaint against TDSHS.

• March 2009: Beleno plaintiffs question where TDSHS has sent the NBS and for what purposes. TDSHS maintains they use and share the NBS for public health research.

• December 2009: Beleno plaintiffs and TDSHS settle the lawsuit out of court.

• March 2010: An investigative report reveals TDSHS sent a total of 800 NBS to the AFIP’s mtDNA registry. TDSHS spokesperson, Carrie Williams, still asserts that this project falls within the category of “public health research.”

• December 2010: Parents led by Jeffrey Higgins file a complaint against TDSHS.

Read past PredictER News coverage relating to newborn blood spots here:

Oklahoma Legislature Requires Express Consent to Retain Newborn Blood Spots

Transparency of Texas' NBS Transfer and Reassessing Evasive Statutory Interpretation

Newborn Blood Spot Banking in Canada

Minnesota Judge's Dismissal of Newborn Blood Spot Case Misses the Mark

Newborn Blood Spot Litigation Continues in Minnesota and Texas

Critiquing HHS's Summary Recommendations on Newborn Blood Spots: Opt-Out is Not Optimal

Newborn Screening: an Update on Minnesota

Minnesota and Genetic Privacy: Why the Rule of Law is Good for Research

See also:

Jere Odell. Newborn Blood Spots, Biobanks, and the Law: Research Ethics in the News. Indiana Bioethics. February 2010.

Katherine Drabiak-Syed. Newborn blood spot banking: approaches to consent. PredictER Law and Policy Update.Indiana University Center for Bioethics. March 12, 2010.

Oklahoma Legislature Requires Express Consent to Retain Newborn Blood Spots

During the past several months, states continue splitting on the issue of how to approach their state health department’s retention and research use of newborn blood spots (NBS).

On September 13, The Edmond Sun ran an article on Oklahoma’s enrolled Senate Bill 1250, a new law that prevents the state health department from storing and using NBS. The text of the law reads:

“A laboratory, medical facility, hospital, or birthing place is prohibited from the unathorized storage, transferring, use, or databasing of DNA from any newborn child without express parental consent.

It being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist…”

Sen. Nichols explained he sponsored the bill as a deliberate pre-emptive measure in response to ethical and privacy concerns related to unauthorized “databasing” and use of NBS in other states. According to Sharon Vaz, the Oklahoma State Department of Health genetics coordinator, Oklahoma only retains the samples for 42 days and does not have plans for long term NBS retention or to use the NBS for research purposes.

Oklahoma’s law demonstrates that different jurisdictions are arriving at starkly divergent interpretations of seemingly simple definitions such as what is or is not encompassed in the meaning of DNA. SB 1250 refers to storing or using DNA, and Sen. Nichols unequivocally explains that he intends this to encompass the retention of NBS- a blood sample. This interpretation is significant because it means the law will use the term DNA to include biological materials from which DNA can be derived.

Unlike Sen. Nichols’ inclusive approach, in late August the Court of Appeals in Minnesota affirmed that NBS do not fall within the definition of “genetic information.” We previously wrote on the Bearder case here. Minnesota has determined that biological samples (such as NBS) that contain DNA and genetic information are not genetic information.

This distinction of separating the source of raw materials (the blood) used for research from the substance of the raw materials (the DNA) is also playing out in the stem cell legal battles- although here, the debate centers around using embryos to create embryonic stem cells v. research using embryonic stem cells. In both arenas, interpreting uncertainty or disagreement of how to apply a law to favor rsearch connects to the decision to splice parts of the process to circumvent barriers to using raw materials.

SB 1250 attempts to rectify several terms that have been disputed when determining the rules for retaining and using biological materials from newborns. Although Sen. Nichols references the law with regard to NBS, the language broadly refers to “DNA from any newborn child,” which would include NBS as well as other biological samples such as umbilical cord blood that contains DNA. This would mean that if an Oklahoma hospital or a partnering research entity wanted to retain and use other biological samples containing DNA from the newborn, the hospital would need to seek parental consent. Furthermore, this law clarifies that the hospital and state health department are not exempt from compliance with the law under a research exception.

Interestingly, the text refers to the law as necessary to preserve the “public peace, health and safety” in Oklahoma. The law is set to be codified in the Oklahoma statute in the same location as crimes consisting of public disturbances, safety hazards, and physical violations against one’s person- examples of tangible harm to indivduals and society at large. This classification itself nods a recognition to the Beleno case in Texas, where plaintiffs’ emphatically argued unauthorized retention of NBS constituted a serious privacy violation and an unlawful seizure of one’s deeply private medical and genetic information.

Whether other state legislatures and health departments agree with Oklahoma’s requirement for express parental consent or the current state of “emergency,” this law reminds us that each jurisdiction should adopt a prospective law or departmental policy to address these questions in a deliberate manner.

--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Berkeley Scheduled to Move Forward with Freshmen DNA Testing

Yesterday, Berkeley’s student newspaper The Daily Californian published on op-ed questioning Berkeley’s decision to move forward with its experiment designed collect DNA from consenting incoming freshman. The “Bring Your Genes to Cal” experiment originally made headlines over a month ago, when the New York Times and other major newspapers described the program and the corresponding polarized responses. In a few weeks, Berkeley is scheduled to send out information packets, informed consent forms, and buccal swab kits to the incoming freshman class to test for genetic variation related to their ability to process lactose, metabolize alcohol, and examine their levels of folic acid.

Mark Schlissel, MD, PhD, Professor of Immunology and Dean of Biological Sciences at Berkeley views the program as a lesson of how genetics and personalized medicine will impact students’ lives in the future. “We wanted to give students a sense of what’s coming, through genes that can provide them with useful information. I think it’s one of the best things we’ve done in years,” said Schlissel to the New York Times. Schlissel described how the campus will hold seminars and forums in the fall to discuss the significance of personal genetic information.

Despite Schlissel’s enthusiasm, the program is not without criticism. Jesse Reynolds, a policy analyst at the Center for Genetics and Society, acknowledged that educating incoming students on new genetic technologies can indeed constitute an important teachable experience, but raised several cautionary notes. First, Reynolds questioned whether students will freely consent to the test or whether they will feel subtle social pressure to submit a DNA sample. Second, and importantly, Reynolds asserted that by suggesting freshmen’s participation in this experiment, Berkeley is legitimizing or promoting the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry.

As recent Berkeley alumnae Jillian Theil pointed out in her op-ed on Monday, the scientific validity of these tests when they are offered by direct-to-consumer (DTC) companies is still unknown. Earlier this month, the FDA stepped forward to assert that tests offered by companies such as 23andme and Navigenics are in fact invitro devices and fall under FDA review. But until the FDA and the companies offering DTC genetic tests work through the regulatory process, the current DTC genetic tests’ analytical and clinical validity remains uncertain.

Problematically, students will not fully learn about the complexities of federal regulation, genetic information, and how to contextually interpret it until after they receive their results during the fall discussion sessions on campus. Contrary to Schlissel’s categorization of these variants as innocuous information, bioethicist George Annas argued that a college student’s genetic variant relating to alcohol metabolism is far from harmless. “What if someone tests negative, and they don’t have the marker, so they think that means they can drink more? Like all genetic information, it’s potentially harmful,” asserted Annas in the New York Times.

Theil’s title hit the mark: proceed with caution, indeed. Students should know that similar tests offered in the marketplace are in the middle of potentially sweeping regulatory changes. Even if Berkeley’s tests are accurate, as Annas noted, students should interpret their genetic information carefully (should they choose to participate) and forgo basing any lifestyle decisions on their results.

--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Judge Grants Partial Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs: Myriad's Gene Patents Are Invalid

On March 29, Judge Sweet issued a ruling in Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office. Known as the lawsuit against Myriad Genetics, this case was posed to answer the widely debated question of whether human genes are patentable. In a 152 page opinion, the Court comprehensively addressed whether the defendants’ patents were valid under the standards set forth in 35 USC § 101 and patent law’s subsequent precedent.

For more information on the case, see our previous posting and our Law & Policy Update.

Judge Sweet granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs related to both the composition and the method claims, finding as a matter of law defendants’ patents were invalid under 35 USC § 101. (For more on the significance of summary judgment, see Genomic Law Report’s posting.) The Court dismissed the Constitutional claims against the USPTO based on the doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance. This means where it is possible to resolve plaintiffs claims without addressing the Constitutional questions, the Court is precluded from addressing these issues.

Defendants argued that by isolating and purifying DNA, they had sufficiently changed a product of nature into a fundamentally new product that satisfied subject matter patentability requirements. Judge Sweet responded to defendants’ arguments by systematically refuting each point. The Court thoroughly dismantled defendants’ reliance on precedent relating to products of nature in Parke-Davis, explaining that this case’s analysis only related to outdated dicta. Purification of a product of nature without additional handiwork or change to the substance is insufficient to meet the requirements for patentability because isolated DNA is not markedly different from native DNA, according to the Court. By definition, isolated DNA can be used for research tool applications where native DNA is unsuitable because it has an identical sequence.

Notably, Judge Sweet also took issue with defendants’ arguments that USPTO and the Court should treat patents for DNA identically to every other chemical. Unlike other chemicals, genes have a double nature because they are both chemical molecules and physical carriers of information. “DNA, and in particular, the ordering of the nucleotides, therefore serves as the physical embodiment of the laws of nature- those that define the construction of the human body,” wrote Judge Sweet. (124) These distinctions suggest that the Court recognizes the problematic implications of continuing to treat DNA as any other chemical- a frenetic race to patent the rest of the human genome without consideration of research or clinical care consequences.

The Court also invalidated defendants’ claims for analyzing and comparing sequences of the BRCA genes, finding that the claims did not meet the required physically transformative step. Preparatory processes such as isolating and sequencing the DNA only constitutes data gathering and are insufficient to transform an abstract mental process of comparing gene sequences into a transformative process. In addition, the Court invalidated defendants’ claim for comparing the growth rate of cells. In that patent, defendants claim stated that a slower growth of cells indicated a cancer therapeutic. Judge Sweet clarified that the essence of this claim merely recited the scientific method and constituted a patent on a basic scientific principle.

This opinion signals an important pause in frantic pursuit of more and more gene patents. Judge Sweet’s analysis commands us to rethink whether precedent ever actually supported patent eligibility for isolated DNA sequences or sequence comparison claims like Myriad’s.

The impact of this decision alone means that some of Myriad’s patents are invalid and it cannot enforce them in the future. However, defendants will likely appeal this decision to the Federal Circuit, which may choose to stay Judge Sweet’s ruling until it renders a final decision. If the final ruling happens to affirm this Court’s findings, then the USPTO would conform its examination policies to avoid issuing patents on isolated DNA or the comparison or analysis of DNA sequences.

-Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Personalized Medicine: PredictER Collaborator Featured in NY Times

David A Flockhart, MD, PhD, Division Chief of the IU Department of Medicine’s Division of Clinical Pharmacology and PredictER Collaborator, was featured in a December 29th New York Times article that is part of a compelling series examining steps taken toward medicine based on evidence. The article, Patient’s DNA May Be Signal to Tailor Medicine, provides a highly readable overview of personalized medicine, illustrates the field’s inherent potential to increase positive outcomes and decrease costs, and then discusses some of the conundrums that genetically-tailored medicine presents. The author, Andrew Pollack, uses the outcomes of Flockhart’s extensive tamoxifen research to aptly illustrate the medical promise of genetic testing and its broader implications. Flockhart’s research demonstrates that a particular enzyme, CYP2D6, is responsible for converting tamoxifen into a different substance, called endoxifen, which is then directly responsible for fighting breast cancer. The CYP2D6 gene, however, varies between people such that the mechanism is inactive in about 7% of the population, and only moderately active in 20-40%. As the article points out, most patients are now treated with a more expensive class of drugs that demonstrated greater efficacy in clinical trials conducted before the role of CYP2D6 was fully understood. For those women with active CYP2D6, however, tamoxifen may well be the better alternative for the patient, both medically and economically. Genetic testing to determine gene activity in this scenario may therefore have vast economic implications for the pharmaceutical industry.

Amy Lewis Gilbert

Genetic Privacy: T.J. Maxx and the NIH

What do T.J. Maxx, the V.A. and NIH have in common? They have all been involved in handling personal data in such a way that individual privacy and confidentiality may have been violated. In December 2006 the financial information of over 40 million customers of T.J. Maxx and Marshall’s was accessed by a hacker potentially exposing customers to identity theft. Also in 2006, a laptop computer containing personal information including names, addresses, dates of birth and social security numbers for 38,000 veterans went missing. This past August, large amounts of aggregate human DNA data that the National Institute of Health and other groups had made open to researchers around the world was removed from public view due to privacy concerns. The reason behind this removal was a study (doi:10.1371/journal.pgen.1000167) released by the Translational Genomics Research Institute and the University of California showing that using an algorithm and a microarray a curious individual could possibly identify whether or not an individual’s DNA was in a genome wide association study (GWAS) database.

Why does this matter? NIH and other groups conducting GWA studies know that one of the core ethical components of their work, and a critical element for convincing people to participate in these studies, is being able to promise that their personal medical and genetic information will not be compromised and will never be used in such a way that might cause them harm. Being able to demonstrate, for example, that a representative of law enforcement armed with a DNA sample from a crime scene could search an existing NIH database for a sample match and be successful, undermines this promise in a way that might give us all pause. Researchers will still have access to the data, but they will now have to apply for access to the data and agree to protect the confidentiality of the data.

As researchers strive to use the information gained by the Human Genome Project for the improvement of health care and the prevention and treatment of disease, more and more of us will be asked to participate in efforts to establish enormous databases of our genotypic (DNA) and phenotypic (medical records) information. I still shop at Marshall’s, but I am not sure I will be giving my DNA anytime soon. --Kimberly A. Quaid

Who Owns Your DNA?

Do I own "my" DNA? I'm not sure … I don't own my height or my eye color, so why should I assert a right to possess my genetic information? At the same time, can anyone truly "own" this information? Should I worry that a research institution or a pharmaceutical company might someday tell me that I can not control what I "do" with my genetic information, because they "own" it? These are vexing questions and seldom addressed in blogs on the ethics of genetic research and the future of personalized medicine. Thus, I couldn't resist sharing this comic by Mike Adams, "Biopiracy Patents and the Rise of Intellectual Imperialism (comic)", Sunday, March 1, 2008. www.NaturalNews.com.

In the article that accompanies the comic, Adams gladly veers off into the art of the alarmist rant: "in the near future, couples who wish to reproduce may be forced to pay intellectual property royalties to wealthy corporations in exchange for the 'rights' to copy their own genes through sexual reproduction". If Adams is right about this one, in the future, the individual members of these "wealthy corporations" will have forgotten that they have or want to have children and grandchildren. Like many rants, however, Adams provides plenty of fuel to start a good discussion; thus, if the comic bores you, read the article.

Biobanks and Dead People: DNA and the Taboo

In an informative, two-part post at the end of August, Blaine Bettinger of The Genetic Genealogist introduced DNA banking for the deceased and questioned the ethics of biobanking without informed consent. In the first post (August 28) Bettinger writes:

DNA storage is being offered by funeral directors and retailers around the world. But it raises a few important questions – how necessary or useful is a dead person’s DNA, and is the retrieval of DNA from someone who has not given consent ethical?

In part 2 (August 29), he notes:

The most important concern about DNA retrieval from the deceased is the question of consent. Unless the deceased was asked before death, retrieval is without consent. Currently, however, you can obtain and analyze anyone’s DNA without consent, so perhaps this isn’t as radical as it seems.

Bettinger's musings stress the importance of individual autonomy--a value that societies often try to protect by requesting "informed consent" or "advanced directives" from willing tissue donors. In the United States many legal drivers have considered the option to consent to organ donation in the event of a fatal accident. Consent, however, for DNA retrieval in such a circumstance, seems somehow out of place … but why? Why isn't DNA retrieval from a recently deceased person protected and facilitated in the same way as is retrieving an eye-ball for transplant or research? Perhaps the latter, organ "retrieval" without a donor's advanced directive, breaks a deep-seated cultural taboo against the mutilation of the human body. If so, why doesn't the thought an unauthorized retrieval of a deceased person's DNA, arouse a similar sense that the human body has been violated? Do we "own" our DNA any less than we own our eyeballs? Is it a matter of aesthetics--DNA retrieval doesn't botch the open casket? Or scarcity? DNA is more common than spit; perhaps we fail to feel as possessive of a bit of human material we are not likely to miss? Or, maybe we just do not include DNA in our concept of the body … How is DNA a part of us? Is it merely information about the body or is it a part of the body our advanced directives are meant to protect?

These are only some of the questions we should consider while entering an era in which the promise of genetic genealogy, genetic research and personalized medicine encourages the practice of DNA biobanking. These are not questions we should leave to funeral directors and the retailers of direct-to-consumer DNA tests. Therefore, The Genetic Genealogist, and many of the other fine blogs at The DNA Network, should be applauded for doing their part to encourage public discussions of these issues.