Legislatures Race to Define Rights and Obligations Relating to Genetic Information: Avoiding Another Bearder

California is the latest state to take steps toward defining permissible uses and restrictions relating to obtaining, retaining, and sharing individuals’ genetic information.  Senator Alex Padilla recently introduced Senate Bill 1267, the Genetic Information Privacy Act, designed to protect individuals against surreptitious testing of their genetic material without consent.  SB 1267 is a comprehensive piece of legislation which would require a specific authorization to obtain, analyze, or disclose genetic information unless otherwise exempted or allowed by law (exemptions include activities such as newborn screening, duties of the medical examiner, using some types of data for research, and law enforcement uses).  The legislation also contains a civil penalty structure for violations and provides a private right of action for aggrieved individuals who suffer economic, bodily, or emotional harm proximately caused by such violations. 

California’s legislation classifies genetic information within a privacy framework and seeks to increase individual control by requiring the individual to understand the purposes of how the information will be used and stored, as well as which entities have access to the information.  Other states such as Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Vermont have introduced similar legislation that govern the collection, retention, and sharing of DNA, genetic information, and or genetic test results.  These states differ in their comprehensiveness and scope- from South Dakota’s paragraph long House Bill 1260 to Alabama’s extensive eleven page House 78.

Unlike California, these states seek to classify DNA, genetic information, and or genetic test results within a property law framework rather than under the umbrella of privacy, which carries distinct legal requirements for transfer, use, and retention.   As legislatures race to define individual rights within existing  legal concepts, they should be well aware of property law’s limitations at upholding individual autonomy while appropriately and efficiently defining permissible research uses depending on how the legislature crafts the language of the statute. 

As we witnessed in the progression of the Bearder v. Minnesota litigation (related to collecting, retaining, and disseminating newborn blood spots) even if a law is seemingly clear, individuals, clinicians, and investigators still may face confusion over relevant terminology and obligations relating to the meaning of key terms and the scope of consent exemptions.  (Blogs and article on that topic here.) Specifically, will these statutes govern the collection, use, and dissemination of genetic information after the analysis of a genetic test using a blood sample or will the language broadly address collecting blood samples, DNA, and genetic test information?  Public health officials, investigators, and individuals have vehemently disagreed over the meaning and scope of these terms and when consent is required.  Individuals have claimed immense injury to privacy and dignity when public health officials and investigators collect, retain, and disseminate their blood samples without consent, while public health officials and investigators decried setbacks to research efforts after they were legally ordered to destroy their improperly obtained blood samples. 

Last November, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified its state Genetic Privacy Act, holding that an individual’s blood sample contains biological information and biological information falls within the definition of genetic information.   That is, any statutory references to genetic information also applies to blood samples.  It appears that the majority adopted the Plaintiffs' argument  that a blood sample contains DNA and the structure of DNA is genetic information, which means statutory requirements governing the collection, use, storage, and dissemination of genetic information necessarily include blood samples.   

Although this seminal holding is jurisdictionally limited, defining the meaning and scope of biological specimen, blood sample, DNA, and genetic information requires painstaking semantic precision.  Furthermore, the concurrence/dissent in Bearder demonstrates even keen legal minds apply varying logic to interpret terminology and arrive at starkly divergent conclusions.  Defining these terms becomes even more pressing should this or similar state legislation pass because it carries the compliance incentive of a penalty structure for violation.  Legislators should take note of litigation in this area and aim to meticulously and unambiguously define relevant terminology so individuals, public health officials, and investigators can understand their interrelated rights, obligations, and statutory exemptions.  

--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Oklahoma Legislature Requires Express Consent to Retain Newborn Blood Spots

During the past several months, states continue splitting on the issue of how to approach their state health department’s retention and research use of newborn blood spots (NBS).

On September 13, The Edmond Sun ran an article on Oklahoma’s enrolled Senate Bill 1250, a new law that prevents the state health department from storing and using NBS. The text of the law reads:

“A laboratory, medical facility, hospital, or birthing place is prohibited from the unathorized storage, transferring, use, or databasing of DNA from any newborn child without express parental consent.

It being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist…”

Sen. Nichols explained he sponsored the bill as a deliberate pre-emptive measure in response to ethical and privacy concerns related to unauthorized “databasing” and use of NBS in other states. According to Sharon Vaz, the Oklahoma State Department of Health genetics coordinator, Oklahoma only retains the samples for 42 days and does not have plans for long term NBS retention or to use the NBS for research purposes.

Oklahoma’s law demonstrates that different jurisdictions are arriving at starkly divergent interpretations of seemingly simple definitions such as what is or is not encompassed in the meaning of DNA. SB 1250 refers to storing or using DNA, and Sen. Nichols unequivocally explains that he intends this to encompass the retention of NBS- a blood sample. This interpretation is significant because it means the law will use the term DNA to include biological materials from which DNA can be derived.

Unlike Sen. Nichols’ inclusive approach, in late August the Court of Appeals in Minnesota affirmed that NBS do not fall within the definition of “genetic information.” We previously wrote on the Bearder case here. Minnesota has determined that biological samples (such as NBS) that contain DNA and genetic information are not genetic information.

This distinction of separating the source of raw materials (the blood) used for research from the substance of the raw materials (the DNA) is also playing out in the stem cell legal battles- although here, the debate centers around using embryos to create embryonic stem cells v. research using embryonic stem cells. In both arenas, interpreting uncertainty or disagreement of how to apply a law to favor rsearch connects to the decision to splice parts of the process to circumvent barriers to using raw materials.

SB 1250 attempts to rectify several terms that have been disputed when determining the rules for retaining and using biological materials from newborns. Although Sen. Nichols references the law with regard to NBS, the language broadly refers to “DNA from any newborn child,” which would include NBS as well as other biological samples such as umbilical cord blood that contains DNA. This would mean that if an Oklahoma hospital or a partnering research entity wanted to retain and use other biological samples containing DNA from the newborn, the hospital would need to seek parental consent. Furthermore, this law clarifies that the hospital and state health department are not exempt from compliance with the law under a research exception.

Interestingly, the text refers to the law as necessary to preserve the “public peace, health and safety” in Oklahoma. The law is set to be codified in the Oklahoma statute in the same location as crimes consisting of public disturbances, safety hazards, and physical violations against one’s person- examples of tangible harm to indivduals and society at large. This classification itself nods a recognition to the Beleno case in Texas, where plaintiffs’ emphatically argued unauthorized retention of NBS constituted a serious privacy violation and an unlawful seizure of one’s deeply private medical and genetic information.

Whether other state legislatures and health departments agree with Oklahoma’s requirement for express parental consent or the current state of “emergency,” this law reminds us that each jurisdiction should adopt a prospective law or departmental policy to address these questions in a deliberate manner.

--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

California Department of Public Health Orders Changes to Berkeley's Genetic Test Program

Last week Berkeley altered its Bring Your Genes to Cal Program to stop the genetic test results from being disseminated back to participating students in response to an order from the California Department of Public Health (CDPH). Berkeley will still hold discussions and lectures based on the aggregate information as previously planned. [See our posting on the Bring Your Genes to Cal Program here.]

On August 11, Berkeley and CDPH met to discuss the program’s compliance with the California Business and Professions Code which requires that a physician order clinical laboratory tests. In a statement to CDPH, Berkeley asserted its program should fall under an exemption for labs performing tests as research where the results are not reported to patients as part of a medical or health assessment. Berkeley maintained that these statutory requirements were not applicable to its program because Bring Your Genes to Cal constituted an “educational experiment,” students are not “patients,” and the three specific gene variants tested are not disease related.


Despite these claims, the program would have returned genetic test results back to each student, which should be defined as part of a health assessment because the program directed students to use these results to inform their dietary and nutritional choices as well as make personal health decisions. According to Dean Schissel’s message to students in the informed consent video, these genetic test results would then allow them to take measures to improve their health such as eating more or less of a particular food, or avoiding alcohol if their test results showed an ethanol “allergy.” Schlissel’s assertion stretched the meaning of California’s exemption in denying that this “experiment” constitutes clinical laboratory tests or that this information is medically significant. Arguments over statuory construction closely parallel the current federal regulatory loopholes relating to DTC genetic tests.

As genomeweb observed, the semantic debate between Berkeley and CDPH is strikingly similar to the volleys between CDPH and DTC genetic test companies that occurred back in 2008. In June of 2008, CDPH had responded to consumer complaints and sent out thirteen cease and desist letters to DTC genetic testing companies, asserting that their policies did not comply with licensure requirements set forth in California law. Two of the targeted companies, 23andMe and Navigenics, asserted they offer an “informational service” providing personal genetic information and not “medical testing services,” so they did not need to obtain a license. CDPH agreed and granted licenses to Navigenics and 23andMe in August 2008.

Now, with Congress and the FDA scrutinizing the federal regulatory requirements, CDPH seems to be responding to the current political shift of opinion and the uncertainties related to providing genetic test results without a physician intermediary and oversight of the test's accuracy and validity. Or perhaps CDPH agreed with concerns in the defeated California Assembly Bill 70. This bill would have urged state schools within the California State University and University of California system from requesting students’ DNA for the purpose of genetic testing.

Defeated AB 70 also raised specific privacy concerns stemming from a university collecting students’ DNA samples for genetic testing and retaining students’ coded genetic information. Although Berkeley's program will incinerate students’ DNA samples following testing, it plans to keep students’ genetic information for further study. Data attack in GWAS studies exemplifies the principle that our understanding of data security relating to genetic information is uncertain, and we have continually underestimated the potential for security breaches. Dean Schlissel’s unwavering promises of absolute privacy seems naively optimistic given what we know in this area.

It seems this “teaching study” has given Berkeley and its freshmen more than they could have anticipated. In addition to the campus lectures about genetics and personalized medicine, students have already learned the ethical and legal complexities associated with emerging technology- the varied parties who have a say, the definition debates, and the unpredictability of the resolution.

--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Havasupai Tribe and Arizona State University Settlement Agreement: ASU to Return the Blood Samples

On April 21, 2010 the New York Times reported that the Havasupai tribe and Arizona State University (ASU) arrived at a settlement agreement relating to litigation over ASU’s alleged misuse of the Havasupai tribe’s blood samples originally collected for diabetes research. (Visit our forthcoming Human Specimen Collection, Biobanking, and Genetic Research Law and Policy Update for more information on the case.)

After millions of dollars spent on litigation in various suits, the tribe and ASU entered into the settlement agreement in March of this year. The settlement contains several provisions including details for ASU’s performance obligations such as:

(1) ASU will pay the plaintiffs a sum of $700,000;

(2) ASU will return all blood samples in its possession; and

(3) ASU will return documents such as lab books and genealogy materials containing research derived from the blood samples, it will direct IRBs at the universities involved in the suit not to approve ongoing or new research using the samples, and it will provide the tribe a list of entities to which it previously transferred the samples.

The settlement agreement also set forth a creative five year collaborative between ASU and the tribe designed to address the tribe’s needs in the areas of education, health and nutrition, economic development, architecture, engineering, and legal governance. Several of these provisions include pursuing funding opportunities to build a high school near the reservation, partnering ASU nursing students to provide clinical care in Supai village, and working with the tribe to develop business plans related to its tourism programs.

Like many other settlements, this agreement specified a monetary exchange. ASU's transfer of $700,000 (split among the forty-one plaintiffs) seems nominal compared to plaintiffs’ request for $25 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages. However, unlike other agreements, the money was arguably not the central concern here and would never alone be sufficient to remedy plaintiffs’ alleged damages without addressing the use and possession of the blood samples.

The return of the samples and research materials highlights several important issues that suggest our current standards and assumptions governing biobanking research are inadequate to address the needs of all research subjects, especially if blood and DNA is particularly significant to a group's cultural values and sense of identity.

First, subjects must be fully informed when they provide consent to use their blood for genetic research and the scope of the research should not exceed the original consent. Second, using the blood for purposes beyond the scope of the original consent may present serious dignitary concerns that researchers may overlook because the substance of these concerns may not even register as a possible harm or risk. Indeed, one of the ASU researchers maintained she was advancing important research and refered to the tribe's claims as "hysterical." Lastly, the importance of how the samples are (mis)used can be so vital to a particular group that return of the samples may be the only mechanism to fully remedy the group’s alleged dignitary harms.

-Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Transparency of Texas’ NBS Transfer and Reassessing Evasive Statutory Interpretation

A recent investigative report from the Texas Tribune revealed new information relating to the sharing of newborn blood spots (NBS) in Texas.

In November 2009, Texas Tribune reporters contacted the Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS) with a record request to review agency information and activities related to the NBS as permitted under the state’s Sunshine laws. TDSHS refused, maintaining that the NBS records were confidential. After parties filed the settlement with the court, Texas Tribune inquired again to obtain the records and found that TDSHS transferred hundreds of de-identified NBS to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to build a mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) registry.

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology designed the mtDNA registry as a forensics tool to identify missing persons, solve old crimes, and eventually, share the samples internationally for law enforcement and anti-terrorism efforts. Throughout the plaintiffs’ allegations and questions, TDSHS asserted it was storing and using the NBS for medical research, never mentioning any forensic use even through plaintiffs’ attorney James Harrington specifically inquired how TDSHS used the samples. TDSHS’ provision of information relating to the mtDNA registry would have been both directly pertinent and material to answering plaintiffs’ questions about the NBS disposition and how plaintiffs chose to proceed with the lawsuit.

In addition to the information on the mtDNA registry, the records request also uncovered email communications from the time when TDSHS began storing NBS at Texas A & M University. When the storage began, Texas A & M asked to issue a press release, but a TDSHS official stated that releasing this information made him “nervous” and would “only generate negative publicity.”

Although the decision revealed in the emails prevented public knowledge of storage for research use, it demonstrates a problematic mentality that transparency poses an unnecessary burden. Remaining in the dark about research using NBS is one issue, but failing to disclose (even when asked on several occasions) that the NBS are included in a registry for forensic and future law enforcement purposes creates a multitude of distinct issues. Both explicit knowledge and consent should be required to include one’s DNA in such a database.

Following terms of the settlement agreement, TDSHS’s website lists projects for which TDSHS uses the NBS. The mtDNA registry is now included on this list of projects, and TDSHS spokesperson Carrie Williams maintains that it falls within the category of “public health research.”

Sweeping forensic and law enforcement uses into the definition of public health research warrants close analysis. First, a plain reading of each definition would clearly show that the purpose of research into the causes of autism is not remotely connected to using DNA to identity a suspected criminal. Applying such a definition extends the limits of creative statutory interpretation too far. Second, states’ legislatures have attempted to impose limits on the use of NBS and other biological samples by creating exemptions or abbreviated pathways when the samples are used for public health research. Including forensic and law enforcement purposes ignores this precision and opens the possibility that samples would be shared for even more uses that would not disclosed to the public because the state health department could use this precedent to assume this use also would constitute “public health research.”

The potential for negative publicity alone should not serve as a barrier to transparency, but rather encourage public education for why TDSHS thought giving NBS to the mtDNA registry (with proper consent) would be beneficial. Dodging specific inquiries related to the uses of NBS, failing to disclose that they were given to this registry, and subsequently classifying the registry as a public health project have created even more of a publicity nightmare than TDSHS could have imagined. Other state health departments may be wise to assess whether their own policies encourage transparency, public engagement, and a sincere interpretation of what projects constitute public health research.


--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Minnesota Judge’s Dismissal of Newborn Blood Spot Case Misses the Mark

On November 24, 2009, Judge Marilyn Rosenbaum signed an order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice in the Bearder et al. v. Minnesota et al. (MDH) lawsuit. This dismissal quickly disposed of plaintiffs’ claims that MDH’s practices of retention and research use of newborn blood spots (NBS) conflicted with specific protections outlined in the Minnesota Genetic Privacy Act (GPA) and constituted violations of their childrens’ property and privacy interests.

Judge Rosenbaum responded to plaintiffs’ claim that MDH failed to comply with the GPA by ruling that the GPA does not even apply to MDH’s actions because:

• NBS samples do not constitute genetic information; and
• The statute contains reference that it will not apply if an express provision in the law exists.

The GPA clearly defines genetic information as:

• “Information about an identifiable individual derived from the presence, absence, alternation, or mutation of a gene… which has been obtained from an analysis of the individual’s biological information or specimen” and
• “Medical and biological information about a particular genetic condition that is or might be used to provide medical care to that individual.”

Judge Rosenbaum’s finding that NBS are not classified as genetic information ignores the plain language of the statute. NBS are collected to analyze the presence, absence, or mutation of a disease during the newborn screening process and used to obtain medical and biological information about a particular genetic condition so parents of newborns can make medical decisions accordingly. Thus, logic compels classifying NBS as genetic information.

Defendants argued that the newborn screening statute which states that the NBS and results of the screening tests “may be retained by the [MDH]” amounts to an express provision authorizing exemption from the GPA. Judge Rosenbaum’s agreement disregards the meaning of “express provision” and the substantive fact that the collection and temporary retention for screening purposes is distinct from the collection, retention, and use for additional research reasons. Accounting for this important division, the statute would have explicitly and distinctly contained a section authorizing additional retention and research use beyond the collection and retention for detection, treatment, and follow up of heritable and congenital disorders if the legislature intended.

Additionally, this interpretation ignores the purpose of the GPA as a means to limit collection of genetic information by a government entity.

The finding that this section of the newborn screening statute (“may be retained by the [MDH]”) constitutes an express provision allowing retention and research beyond the initial screening poses two additional dilemmas. First, it problematically ratifies blurring screening with additional retention and research. Second, Judge Rosenbaum’s finding ignores that the retention and research is not limited to the MDH but extends to its research partners such as the University of Minnesota, the Mayo Clinic, and the CDC.

Randall Knutson, attorney for the plaintiffs, responded:

“It is our hope to bring some legal guidance and common sense to DNA issues, including the storage and dissemination of genetic information by our government agencies. As it now stands, the State of Minnesota appears free to use and sell our genetic information, without us having any say in the matter. That is simply unacceptable, and we intend to continue to fight on to change this situation.”

Knutson plans to appeal Judge Rosenbaum’s decision.

--Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Newborn Blood Spot Litigation Continues in Minnesota and Texas

The litigation occurring in Minnesota and Texas regarding the unauthorized retention and research use of newborn blood spots (NBS) continues, and has developed into respective battles seeking judicial recognition for a property and privacy interest in one’s genetic material from which governmental entities such as state health departments are not exempt.

In September 2009, the Minnesota district court heard the defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment in Bearder et al. v. Minnesota et al. (MDH). MDH argued that there are no genuine issues of material fact so the court could simply rule as a matter of law in its favor to exempt the application of the Minnesota Genetic Privacy statute to the state health department's activities as well as preclude any of the plaintiffs’ privacy claims. Following this interpretation, two active bills in the Minnesota House (HF 1341) and Senate (SF 1478) seek to alter Minnesota state law by creating a compliance exemption for the state health department.

According to Bearder et al.'s attorney Randall Knutson, the parties are waiting for the court’s ruling, which is scheduled for return before December 18, 2009. Plaintiffs contend that NBS are genetic information, individuals have a property and privacy interest in their DNA, both tort and Constitutional law protect these interests, and they seek to compel MDH’s compliance with the Minnesota Genetic Privacy Act.

Bearder et al.’s memorandum of law submitted to the court prior to the hearing developed concerns related to MDH’s continued noncompliance with the Minnesota Genetic Privacy Act. Mark McCann, Manager of Public Health Laboratory in the Newborn Screening Program testified before the Minnesota Senate that “the number of parents who have given consent to store…the residual dried blood spots with the Minnesota Department of Health is zero” and despite the Minnesota Genetic Privacy Law requiring that the MDH obtain parental consent for retention and research use, according to McCann, actually obtaining consent is not a current practice.

The memorandum also describes the intersection of problematic shortcomings related to parental requests for destruction, “de-identification,” and research sharing with outside entities such as MDH’s $6 million contract with the Mayo Clinic. According to plaintiffs’ affidavits, some parents were not even told that the specimens would be retained and used for genetic research purposes (undermining the ability to request their destruction) or their requests for destruction were not honored. MDH refers to its system of storing and sharing the NBS as “de-identified” but it provides linked and coded NBS to the Mayo Clinic, retains the key to re-link the specimens (meaning they are not in fact “de-identified,”) and admits there is no standardized procedure for this process.

In Texas, the companion case Beleno et al. v. Texas Department of State Health Services et al. (TDSHS) asserts that individuals have a fundamental privacy interest in their DNA, which exists even absent any statutory provision specifically recognizing genetic privacy. On September 22, 2009, the Texas district court judge denied TDSHS’s motion to dismiss, meaning the court would schedule a hearing for the merits of the case unless the parties arrived at an alternate settlement. The Texas Civil Rights Project which represents plaintiffs indicated that the parties are in settlement negotiations, but as of November 20, 2009, parties have yet to sign an agreement.

Even if parties reach a settlement, Beleno et al.’s arguments used in this case merit pause and further examination. In plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, Beleno et al. argue that the defendants committed unlawful and unreasonable seizure, because although parents may have consented to providing the NBS for screening tests, they did not consent to the retention and research use of NBS. Even if the NBS were de-identified, plaintiffs argue that TDSHS unlawfully seized the specimens if they did not obtain actual parental consent, highlighting that issues of consent and privacy are both distinct yet inextricably linked both in practice and legal analysis. Importantly, Beleno et al. also argue that passive storage even absent any additional research or sharing of NBS constitutes a per se violation of Constitutional and tort privacy principles given the fact that they contain deeply private medical and genetic information.

Independent of how these courts proceed, these two cases continue to ask:

• Do, or should, we have a property or privacy interest arising from tort or Constitutional principles in our genetic material (here, in the form of NBS) that requires consent to transfer this interest?
• Can we minimize the potential for future litigation simply by obtaining parental consent for retention and research use?
• Would creating codified exemptions for state health departments deter or encourage privacy advocates from litigation?
  

-Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Critiquing HHS's Summary Recommendations on Newborn Blood Spots: Opt-Out is Not Optimal

On August 21, 2009 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued “Considerations and Recommendations for a National Policy Regarding the Retention and Use of Dried Blood Spot Specimens after Newborn Screening” relating to storage and use of newborn blood spots (NBS). The agency recommendations discussed assurances of privacy and confidentiality for storage and advised that each state should disseminate policies that promote public trust, emphasize transparency, and encourage informed public participation. It promulgated seven recommendations, including: all states should have a policy in place to address NBS retention, use, and research access; states should provide educational materials to the public and expecting mothers on use and potential future uses; and states should adopt an opt-in or opt-out model if NBS are available for any process outside the screening process or internal screening test development.

However, parental attitudes and pending litigation in this area suggests that the agency’s goals to promote public trust and encourage public participation may not be achieved with these guidelines.

Tarini, et al.’s survey in Public Health Genomics examined parental willingness to permit NBS storage and research. If permission is obtained, 76.2% of parents were very or somewhat willing to permit use of NBS for research, but if permission was not obtained, only 28.2% of parents would be very or somewhat willing to permit use of NBS for research. These results show most parents will permit retention and use as long as they are asked, reiterating the importance of respecting a person’s autonomy and dignity to permit or refuse participation.

Two pending cases in Minnesota and Texas confirm the results of Tarini et al.’s study and demonstrate that collection, retention, and research use of NBS and associated PHI even if conducted or facilitated by the state department of health is biobanking research. Accordingly, it should be governed under the Common Rule and Privacy Rule, meaning actual consent is not only optimal but perhaps required.

In June 2009, Minnesota parents (Bearder, et al.) filed a civil complaint against the state of Minnesota and the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH, et al.) for failing to comply with the Minnesota Genetic Privacy Act and continuing to store and use NBS without consent. The complaint contains a litany of claims, including violation of the Minnesota Genetic Privacy Act, eight tort claims, fundamental right claims, and government taking. Plaintiffs’ claims for intrusion into seclusion, fraud and misrepresentation, and government taking summarize the essence of the alleged injury:

• A person has a privacy interest in his or her own blood (acting as guardian for the newborns’ blood) and the medical information that may be obtained from it;
• The MDH intentionally omitted that the NBS was not taken solely for screening but would be retained and used, knew that parents would provide them NBS for the purpose of screening, and parents relied on these representations but would not have consented to providing MDH the NBS had they known; and
• Blood and genetic information constitute a “valuable national resource” and a represent a “gold mine” for the state and affiliated researchers that the government cannot automatically appropriate even in the name of public health research.

In a prayer for relief, plaintiffs request damages as statutorily indicated, request an injunction, and a cease and desist order against MDH. Minnesota’s history confirms that NBS collection, retention, and research falls within its Genetic Privacy Act, meaning a separate consent is required for each activity; and importantly, that the research conducted or approved by the Minnesota Department of Health is not exempt from these requirements.

In Texas, parents (Beleno, et al.) filed a civil complaint in March 2009 against the Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS, et al.) claiming TDSHS has no legal authority to retain and use NBS without consent. Beleno et al. assert this practice violates the privacy principles as well as violates the prohibition against seizure. Plaintiffs request that the court order the destruction of all NBS stored without consent (around 4.2 million samples) since it began the practice in 2002 or obtain retroactive parental consent. Additionally, plaintiffs seek an order to compel TDSHS to disclose for what purposes the NBS have been used and financial transactions involving the NBS.

New legislation TX HB 1672 that implements a compromise by using an opt-out system was signed into law and will take effect September 2009. It remains to be seen whether all Texas parents will agree with this solution and how the court will address the issue of what to do with the 4.2 million NBS that were stored without consent.

If NBS constitute such a valuable resource, then it is incumbent on us to encourage transparency of state health departments’ intentions by educating parents on the importance of using NBS for research purposes, how the state plans to use them, and respect parents enough not to circumvent the law’s intent but actually obtain their consent. If not, parents could turn to the judicial system and potentially prevail, creating a costly and lengthy legal battle for the state health department as well as jeopardizing the current collection of NBS.

-Katherine Drabiak-Syed

Patient Attitudes Toward Genotyping: Willingness to Donate

The November 2008 issue of Obstetrics & Gynecology included an article addressing an Indiana University study which sought to ascertain the willingness of women to donate DNA specimens. The article, “Patient Attitudes Toward Genotyping in an Urban Women’s Health Clinic” (David M. Haas, Jamie L. Renbarger, Eric M. Meslin, Katherine Drabiak, and David Flockhart), acknowledges the great promise of the emerging fields of genotype association studies and pharmacogenetics, which will theoretically allow for targeted medical interventions, personalized drug therapies and the more efficient allocation of healthcare resources. The study compared women’s willingness to donate DNA specimens via blood and saliva collection, and looked at several other factors to confirm the findings of previous studies regarding which of those factors predicate a willingness to donate. The authors found that more women are willing to donate DNA using saliva than blood, and that higher levels of education (college and beyond) and greater knowledge of genes and DNA increase women’s willingness to donate.

So how do these findings translate into ethical practice? How will they inform the future collection of samples for both medical and research purposes? It seems that researchers and practitioners should bear in mind that less-invasive methods of DNA procurement are preferred, and that education about purpose and use be stressed during the informed consent process. When asked about the translational implications of this study, Dr. Eric Meslin, co-author and Director of the Indiana University Center for Bioethics, said: “the key to success in any biobanking effort lies in the scientific community’s ability to both acquire and maintain the public’s trust. Informed consent may be evidence of the public’s willingness to permit specimens to be used for research, but consent should never be confused with the public’s willingness to trust science to do the right thing.” -Amy Lewis Gilbert